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Abstract
We present a two-level model of organizational training and
agent production. Managers decide whether or not to train
based on both the costs of training compared to the benefits
and on their expectations and observations of the number of
other firms that also train. Managers also take into account
the sum of their employees’ contributions and the average
tenure length within their organization. Employees decide
whether or not to contribute to production based on their
expectations as to how other employees will act. Trained
workers learn over time and fold their increased produc-
tivity into their decision whether or not to contribute. We
find that the dynamical behavior at the two levels is closely
coupled: the evolution of the industry over time depends
not only on the characteristics of training programs, learn-
ing curves, and cost-benefit analyses, but on the vagaries
of chance as well. For example, in one case, the double
dilemma can be resolved for the industry as a whole and
productivity then increases steadily over time. In another,
the organizational level dilemma may remain unresolved
and workers may contribute at fluctuating levels. In this
case the overall productivity stays low. We also find a cor-
relation between high productivity and low turnover and
show that a small increase in training rates can lead to
explosive growth in productivity.
Introduction
During periods of slow growth and a weak economy, cor-
porations often cut programs in order to maintain prof-
itability. Training programs in particular are often tar-
geted because employee turnover is generally higher dur-
ing times of economic uncertainty [1]. Even in the best
of times, organizations must decide how much to invest
in on-the-job training, balancing the benefits of increased
productivity against the costs of training. Even worse,
since trained workers can migrate more easily between
competing firms, another firm can potentially enjoy the
increased productivity of workers trained by the former
employer without paying the costs. Consequently, a com-
pany’s incentive to train may fall when employee turnover
is high [2, 3]. Ironically, numerous studies have shown
that untrained workers change jobs more often [1, 4]. Can
the vicious circle be broken?
An organization’s decision whether or not to train its
workers also affects the economy, whether or not the firm
factors this variable into its decision. If all firms within an
industry fail to train their workers then the whole economy
suffers. In this sense, training workers is another type
of public good [1], a category which encompasses social
dilemmas ranging from the support of public radio to
the so-called “tragedy of the commons” [5] to recycling
programs. Resolving the dilemma depends not only on
the benefits and costs associated with a particular training
program, but also on the firm’s expectations concerning
employee turnover and the policies of competing firms.
Employees face a similar dilemma in their choice of
how much they contribute to the overall productivity of the
organization. If employees receive a share of the profits
regardless of their contribution, some may decide to free
ride on the efforts of their fellow workers. However, if all
employees reason similarly, the company will fail. Profit-
sharing and employee-ownership exacerbate the dilemma.
While, in principle, the problem could be resolved by strict
management, in practice, worker monitoring is always
imperfect and employee effort can vary from high to low
within the range allowed.
The two dilemmas on the employee and organizational
levels are tightly interlaced. On the one hand, the benefits
of training accrue only to the extent that employees con-
tribute to the organization. Thus, a firm should take into
account how it expects a training program to affect em-
ploye effort as well as employee turnover. On the other
hand, trained workers produce at higher rates, which in
turn may affect how much they contribute and how often
they migrate to other firms compared to untrained workers.
(Once again, all the makings for a vicious circle!)
In this paper we study the dynamics of training and
turnover in firms facing both organizational and employee-
level dilemmas. First we establish a simple model that
captures these conflicts and incorporates imperfect infor-
mation and both worker and organizational expectations.
Organizations can be both created and dissolved, and em-
ployees can move between firms, start new ones, or leave
the industry for good. Next we summarize the different
ways the dilemmas can unfold over time, collated from
a number of computer experiments. For example, under
one set of conditions, the double dilemma can be resolved
for the industry as a whole and productivity then increases
steadily over time. Alternatively, the organizational level
dilemma may remain unresolved and workers may con-
tribute at fluctuating levels. In this case the overall pro-
ductivity stays low. We also find a correlation between
high productivity and low turnover and show that a small
increase in training rates can lead to explosive growth in
productivity.
Our dynamical model of training and turnover in orga-
nizations both confirms the empirical observation that the
two variables are tightly interlinked and reveals how the
connections might be unraveled.
Modelling Organization and Agent Strategies
In this section, we describe our model of organizational
training, individual learning, and decision-making on both
the individual and organizational levels. In our simplified
model, all organizations within an “industry” produce the
same good, for which there is a completely elastic demand
outside the industry. This assumption means that the in-
dustry can grow indefinitely since there is no ceiling for
production. Agents, or “employees,” can move between
organizations, within the bounds allowed by the organi-
zations’ “managers.” The managers must decide whether
or not to train the agents in their own organization, and
the agents must decide whether or not to contribute to
production.
Interwoven social dilemmas
Our model of management training and employee produc-
tion is a two-level social dilemma. At the level of the
agent, each individual must decide whether or not to con-
tribute to production (a binary approximation to the con-
tinuous range of effort they can deliver). For the case of
profit-sharing assumed by the model, each agent receives
an equal share of its organization’s total production, inde-
pendent of its contribution. Each agent is tempted to free
ride on the industriousness of the other agents, but if all
agents do so, nothing is produced and everyone loses.
On the higher level of management, organizations must
decide whether or not to train their agents. If a manager
decides to train, then members of its organization learn
over time, and when its members do contribute to pro-
duction, they do so at progressively higher levels as time
progresses. However, training agents comes with a cost
to the total utility produced by the organization, which
management must take into account. Why should an or-
ganization train its agents only to have them stolen away
by a competitor? On the other hand, if all agents receive
training, the entire industry is better off, collecting higher
and higher utility over time. Thus the dilemma.
Expectations
Recent work on the dynamics of single organizations suf-
fering from the agent-level social dilemma has shown that
high levels of production can be sustained when groups
are small or hierarchically structured into smaller groups
with fluid boundaries [6–8]. The ongoing nature of the
social dilemma lessens its severity if the agents take into
account the future when making decisions in the present.
How an agent takes into account the future is wrapped
into what we call its expectations. The barest notion of
expectations comes from the economic concept of horizon
length. An agent’s horizon length is how far it looks into
the future, or how long it expects to continue interacting
with the other agents in its organization. The agent’s hori-
zon may be limited by its lifetime, by its projection of the
organization’s lifetime, by bank interest rates, etc.
Here our notion of expectations parts from the standard
rational expectations treatment in economics [9]. Rational
expectations assumes that agents form expectations about
the future using near-perfect knowledge of the underlying
model. This notion is self-consistent, but circular: the
agents predict the future exactly.
We formulate expectations more as beliefs than knowl-
edge. (In a more complex model the beliefs underlying the
expectations could evolve over time as more information
became available.) In our model of expectations, agents
believe that their present actions will affect those of oth-
ers in the future. The extent of the effect depends on the
size of the organization and the present level of produc-
tion. The larger the group, the less significance an agent
accords its actions: the benefit produced by the agent is
diluted by the size of the group when it is shared among
all agents. If an agent free rides, it can expect the effect
to be very noticeable in a small group, but less so in a
larger group. This is similar to the reasoning a student
uses when deciding whether or not to attend a lecture she
would prefer to skip. Among an audience of 500, her ab-
sence would probably go unnoticed (and if all students in
the class reason similarly . . . ). On the other hand, in a
small seminar of ten, she might fear the personal censure
of her professor.
In our model, the agents also expect that their actions
will be imitated by other agents and that the extent of
this mimicry depends on present levels of production. An
agent expects that if it decides to free ride (“defect”) in a
group of contributors, or “cooperators,” others will even-
tually choose to defect as well. The agent also believes
that the rate at which the switchover occurs over time de-
pends on the fraction of the group presently cooperating.
The more agents already cooperating, the faster the tran-
sition to defection. Similarly, an agent expects that if it
starts cooperating in a group of free riders, others will start
cooperating over time. Once again the agent believes that
the rate depends on the proportion of cooperators, which
in this case is very low. Our key assumption is that agents
believe their actions influence contributors, or “coopera-
tors” more than sluggards, or “defectors.”
Consider the set of beliefs the agent expects of others
in the context of recycling programs. Not too long ago
very few towns had such programs. Perhaps you would
read in the paper that a small town in Oregon had started
a recycling program. Big deal. But several years later,
when you read that cities all over your state have jumped
onto the recycling bandwagon, then suddenly the long-
term benefits of recycling seem more visible: recycled
products proliferate in the stores, companies turn green,
etc. Alternatively, imagine some futuristic time when
everyone recycles, in fact your town has been recycling
for years, everything from cans to newspapers to plastic
milk jugs. Then you hear that some places are cutting back
their recycling efforts because of the expense and because
they now believe that the programs don’t do that much
good after all. You think about all your wasted effort and
imagine that the other towns still recycling are reaching
the same conclusion. Suddenly, your commitment to
recycling no longer seems so rational.
To sum up, agents believe that the strength of their in-
fluence on the amount of cooperation decreases with the
size of the group, increases with the current proportion
contributing, and extends into the future as far as their
horizon. To some extent, this set of beliefs is arbitrary
and, certainly, domain-specific. It is easy to imagine other
scenarios for which another set of expectations would be
more appropriate. However, there is a class of expecta-
tions for which the general conclusions of our work hold.
In the present interlocking model of organizational train-
ing and agent cooperation, we extend the formulation of
expectations to the organizational level. Managers decide
to train or not based on the number of organizations in
the industry and on the number that presently train their
agents. Folded into this decision and into their expecta-
tions is the behavior of the agents that comprise a man-
ager’s organization. A manager’s horizon length depends
on the tenure lengths of its agents: the longer its agents
stick around, the longer it expects them to stick around
in the future, and the more reason a manager has to train
them. Likewise, a manager predicts greater future value
from training when more of its agents are actively con-
tributing instead of free riding.
Strategies for cooperation
A low-level description of the model includes a number
of parameters that describe agent and organizational at-
tributes. The tables below list these parameters and their
definitions for agents and organizations.
In a profit-sharing organization in which individual
agents receive equal shares of the utility produced by the
group, the utility to agent i in organization m is its share
Agent attributes
bmin Baseline benefit (per unit time) of
cooperation
bmi Benefit (per unit time) of cooperation
for agent i belonging to organization m
c Cost (per unit time) of cooperation
H Horizon length
ki Binary variable: ki = 1 if agent i
contributes, 0 otherwise
 Learning rate
r Fraction of learning transferred across
organizations
tmi Tenure length of agent i in organization
m
 Reevaluation rate
p Measure of uncertainty
Organizational attributes
N Total number of organizations in the
industry
nm Number of agents in organization m
m Binary variable: m = 1 if organization
m trains, 0 otherwise
T Training cost per agent per unit time
Hm Horizon length for manager m
m Reevaluation rate for manager m
q Measure of uncertainty
fmc Estimated fraction cooperating in
organization m
minus its cost for cooperation:
Ui =
1
nm
nmX
j=1
bmj kj   cki: (1)
The individual utility depends indirectly on the managerial
policies of organization m. If manager m does not train,
then the benefit of cooperation for its agents stays fixed,
while if the manager does train, the benefit increases lin-
early over time. The linear model of learning is described
by the differential equation
dbmi
dt
= m: (2)
All agents start off with bmi = bmin. If an agent switches
to a different organization l in the industry it retains only
a fraction of the training it received:
bli = r(b
m
i   bmin) + bmin; (3)
but its benefit never falls below the baseline benefit, bmin.
This models incomplete transfer of knowledge between
organizations.
The utility to the organization as a whole is the to-
tal amount produced by its constituent agents minus any
training costs:
Um =
nmX
j=1
bmj kj   nmTm: (4)
Notice that the organizational utility per agent has a func-
tional form that is very similar to the individual agent
utility. Only the cost term is different.
Agents and managers use their respective utility func-
tions to guide their decisions to contribute or not con-
tribute, to train or not train. They project future earnings
in accordance with their expectations and their horizon
lengths. For individual agents, the criteria for coopera-
tion was derived in [7] for a simpler model and extends
easily to the present case. Individuals cooperate if their
observed share of production
hbim = 1
nm
nmX
j=1
bmj kj (5)
exceeds the critical amount
bmcrit 
bmin
H

nmc  bmi
bmi + mH   c

: (6)
According to this criterion, beyond a critical group size,
no agent will cooperate, and below a second critical group
size, all agents will cooperate. Between the two limits,
there are two equilibrium points, one of mostly coopera-
tion, the other of mostly defection. The group dynamics
tends towards the equilibrium closest to its initial starting
point. Generally, one of the equilibria is metastable, while
the other is the long-term equilibrium. If a group falls into
a metastable state, it may remain there for very long times
(exponential in the size of the group). Because of uncer-
tainty (modeled using the parameters p and q) the group
will eventually switch over to the global equilibrium very
suddenly (in time logarithmic in the size of the group), as
shown in [6].
The training criterion for organizations follows by anal-
ogy. A manager trains when the observed fraction of or-
ganizations training exceeds the critical amount
fmcrit 
1
Hmm

Nt  fmc
fmc   t

: (7)
This criterion has the following properties. Managers are
more likely to train when their horizon lengths are long,
when training costs are low compared to the agents’ learn-
ing rate, when the number of organizations is small, and
when they estimate a large proportion of their agents to be
cooperating. A manager can estimate the fraction cooper-
ating from the production level it observes by inverting the
organizational utility given by Eq. 4. This estimate will
differ from the actual fraction cooperating since an or-
ganization’s agents may have received different amounts
of training and will consequently have different benefits
for cooperation. We model the manager’s estimate of the
fraction cooperating as
fmc =
1
bmin
0@ 1
nm
nmX
j=1
bmi ki
1A: (8)
This estimate overstates the amount of cooperation and
worsens as the agents learn over time.
We intend the two conditions for action to be taken
as heuristic guidelines as opposed to formulae writ in
stone. While the agent-level condition for cooperation
was derived from the expectations sketched out earlier,
its qualitative features are what interest us. We expect
the heuristic form of the criteria to hold for a wide range
of expectations. For some sets of expectations they may
not hold, in which case a different model would then be
appropriate.
Fluidity
We also model the changing structural nature of industries
over time. We use the term fluidity to describe the ease
with which structure can change. The parameters which
govern the amount of fluidity in an industry are listed in the
table below. For the purposes of our model, we consider
them as given exogenously; they could also be thought
of us under the control of some metalevel agent (say,
some regulatory mechanism) which adjusts the fluidity
parameters in order to optimize the overall utility of the
industry or perhaps even under individual agent control.
Fluidity describes the ease with which agents can move
within an organization from subgroup to subgroup, how
promptly they leave the organization for another one or
leave the industry completely seeking higher personal util-
ity, and how readily they start an organization of their own.
Organizations restrict structural fluidity to the extent they
make it difficult for agents to join and difficult for them
to leave or move within their organizations.
In this work, structural fluidity is modeled in the fol-
lowing manner. Managers control the rate at which con-
stituent agents choose to move between organizations and
the rate at which agents from a pool of agents exterior
to the industry can join, but do not restrict agents from
leaving. Specifically, agents move between organizations
Fluidity parameters
 moving threshold
 break away threshold

 entrepreneurial rate
 joining threshold
or join an organization only when invited by a manager.
Agents accept or decline the invitation according to mov-
ing and joining strategies that optimize utility and take into
account moving and joining costs (set at the metalevel).
Say that agent i in organization m is invited to join organ-
ization l. Agent i compares its organization’s production
level with that of organization l. Agent i will move only if
hbil   hbim > bmin; (9)
where hbim was defined in Eq. 5 and  < 1. Similarly,
if an agent j is invited to join organization m from the
outside pool of agents, the agent will join organization
m only if the organization’s production level exceeds the
agent’s costs:
hbim > c; (10)
with  > 1 generally.
Agents can also decide to “break away” or leave the
industry for good. In our model, an agent will break
away when its organization’s production level falls below
a lower threshold parametrized by the break away variable
:
hbim < c: (11)
Some (small) fraction of the time, parametrized by the
entrepreneurial rate, 
, the agent will start a new organi-
zation within the industry instead of leaving. In this fash-
ion, the number of organizations in the industry can grow
over time. The number of organizations also decreases
whenever all agents from one organization have left.
In previous work, we described how structural flu-
idity within a single organization enables agent-level
cooperation [7]. In this paper, we assume that the time-
scale of structural change on the organizational level is
much shorter than on the industry level so that we can
ignore intra-organizational fluidity and better pinpoint the
effects of training and inter-organizational fluidity.
Computer Experiments
The simulation of our model runs on two levels: the
agent level and the organizational level. Agents wake up
asynchronously according to a Poisson process with mean
1=. When they wake up, they either (1) reevaluate their
decision to cooperate or not according to the condition for
cooperation given in Eq. 6; or (2) reevaluate their choice
to stay in their organization, or start a new organization,
or break away from the industry completely, following the
decision function given in Eq. 11.
Each manager m also wakes up asynchronously, but
according to a Poisson process whose mean, nm=, de-
pends on the size, nm, of its organization. This reflects
both the more ponderous decision-making of larger or-
ganizations and the longer time-scales over which orga-
nizations reevaluate their decisions compared to agents.
When a manager wakes up, it either (1) reevaluates its
decision whether or not to train its agents, following the
condition in Eq. 7; or (2) invites an agent from a com-
petitor organization to join. In the second case, if the
invited agent refuses to join, then the manager will invite
an agent from the outside pool to join. The moving and
joining conditions for the agents are given in Eqs. 9 and
10. Organizations, of course, prefer to steal away agents
from competitors since they most likely produce at higher
levels, thanks to training, but agents will switch only if
they perceive a gain in personal utility.
This is only one of many ways to simulate such a model.
Our experience running similar types of simulations in-
dicates that the most important feature is that the agent
and managerial states be updated asynchronously [10], not
synchronously, in order to accurately model continuous
time. Other features of the algorithm described above
have little effect on the qualitative results described in the
next section.
Results
The dynamics on the organizational level mirrors the
agent-level description given earlier: when the number
of organizations in the industry exceeds a critical num-
ber, none train, and when it falls below another critical
number, all train. Again, between these two critical sizes
there is a middle region in which there are two equilibria:
one in which all managers train, and one in which none
train. The transition from the metastable state to the global
equilibrium may not happen for a time exponential in the
number of organizations and is very sudden when it finally
occurs. The critical numbers depend on the learning rate
of the agents and the training cost for the organizations.
However, for fluid industries in which agents can move
in and out of various organizations, the critical regions
for cooperation and defection shift for both agents and
organizations. For agents, the critical regions shift because
the size of their parent organizations changes over time.
A small cooperating organization will tend to grow over
time because outside agents see its high productivity. If
the organization becomes too large and its agents do not
receive training, then eventually a transition to overall
defection will take place. Once all the agents in the
organization are defecting, the group’s size will shrink
because many (or all) will break away from the industry
or move to another organization. At some point, the group
will again be small enough to support cooperation. This
cycle of cooperation-growth to defection-attrition and back
again repeats over and over for each organization when
managers do not train. The amount of cooperation within
different organizations and their sizes are coupled because
of the agents moving between organizations.
The critical regions also shift in time for each organ-
ization, depending on how many of its agents cooperate
and how long the agents stay in the same organization.
Over time, what was originally an unresolvable dilemma
for the managers (so none train) becomes resolvable, and
eventually the dilemma can disappear completely. The
behavioral regions shift (1) as the agents’ tenure lengths
change; and (2) as the agents’ production levels increase.
The agents’ tenure in a particular organization increases
when agents remain loyal to the their parent organiza-
tion. Generally, agents are loyal when their colleagues
cooperate. Tenure lengths are short when few cooper-
ate within an organization since agents will move often
or break away. Agents’ production levels increase when
their parent organizations train them and when the agents
cooperate among themselves.
Dynamics of industry growth
The dynamics of agent and organizational behavior is
closely coupled. Cooperation at one level encourages co-
operation on the other level and similarly with defection.
At both levels, there can be metastable states which trap
the industry in lower-performing states (or higher perform-
ing states). For certain parameters the industry is in the
two-equilibria region on both the agent level and the or-
ganizational level. The rest of this paper will concentrate
primarily on the behavior of the industry for this regime.
The dynamics of the industry is highly path-dependent.
For the same initial conditions and parameter choices,
the industry can evolve to a number of different states.
Figs. 1 and 2 show a series of snapshots taken from the
time evolution of two industries starting from the same
initial conditions. Initially, both industries consist of four
organizations, with eight agents each. The total number
of agents in the industry is printed at the top of the
schematic tree. The agents cooperate initially, as indicated
by the filled lower-level circles. None of the managers
are training, as indicated by the open upper-level circles
(the same code, filled circles for cooperation/training and
open circles for defection/no training are used for both
agents and managers). Both industries grow in size at first
since their agents cooperate and new agents from outside
the industry are attracted by the high levels of production
(increasing the size of the industry as a whole). Once an
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Fig. 1. Snapshots of the time evolution of an industry faced with social dilemmas at both the individual agent and organizational
levels. Agents must decide whether or not to cooperate knowing that they receive a share of their organization’s production regardless.
Organizations must decide whether or not to train knowing that the costs of training will be lost if their agents switch to another
organization. The dynamics of the industry is highly path-dependent. For the same initial conditions and parameters, the industry
can evolve to a number of different states. The snapshots above are taken from a simulation for which the number of organizations
proliferates over time and the dilemma on the organizational level becomes untenable—there is no training of the agents. Since there
is no training, the industry’s utility can increase only because agents join.
Time = 700
Time = 500Time = 0
Fig. 2. Snapshots of the time evolution of an industry starting from the same initial conditions and for the same choice of parameters as
in the previous figure. The dynamical path followed in this case is very different. The number of organizations remains small for long
enough that the organizations switch over to the equilibrium in which all organizations train. Once settled in the training equilibrium,
the agents produce at higher and higher levels attracting more agents from outside the organization to join, further increasing the total
utility produced by the industry as a whole.
organization grows too large, its agents switchover to
defection and move to another organization or break away
completely (decreasing the size of the industry).
The number of organizations varies stochastically: or-
ganizations die whenever all of its constituent members
leave, and new organizations form because entrepreneurs
strike out on their own. The balance between these two
trends depends on the average rates of the various events
and on chance. When the number of organizations hap-
pens to grow over time, the dilemma on the organizational
level becomes untenable—the switchover to overall train-
ing never happens. Instead, the number of organizations
proliferates over time and the industry tends towards a
state of many organizations, each with a small number of
members who cycle between states of cooperation and de-
fection. This is the process indicated by Fig. 1. On the
other hand, if the number of organizations happens to stay
constant or shrink, the managers will eventually all decide
to train their agents. In this case, the industry tends to-
wards a state with a small number of very large, highly
productive organizations. Fig. 2 depicts such an industry.
The overall utility to the industry over time depends
strongly on the path the industry follows. Fig. 3 shows
the abrupt deviation in overall utility between the two
industries of Figs. 1 and 2. Once the organizations in the
second industry switch over to the training equilibrium,
the industry’s utility rises steadily as the industry attracts
more agents who learn and produce more over time.
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Fig. 3. Utility as a function of time for the two industries
described in Figs. 1 and 2, in gray and black respectively. The
utility at time step 1000 for the industry of Fig. 1 is more than
seven times greater than that of Fig. 2 (1000 compared with 140).
Maximizing industry-wide productivity
We also studied how sensitive the performance of the in-
dustries is to the values of various parameters in the model.
We found that two parameters were most significant, given
the constraint that the model be kept in the regime of the
two-level social dilemma. These were the entrepreneurial
rate (the rate at which agents that break away start a new
company) and the ratio of the learning rate to the training
costs. When the entrepreneurial rate is high, the number
of organizations proliferate rapidly and the likelihood that
the organizations spontaneously decide to train drops. On
the other hand, if the entrepreneurial rate is low, the num-
ber of organizations remains small, and the transition to
overall training becomes much more likely. Low entre-
preneurial rates also limit the overall size of the industry.
The effect of varying the learning rate is more inter-
esting since companies or industries may have some con-
trol over this variable. In order to determine the average
effect of increasing the learning rate while keeping train-
ing costs fixed, we ran the simulation many times for the
same choice of parameters and initial conditions. Fig. 4
shows the average utility over 30 runs for each data point.
The average utility increases exponentially with increas-
ing learning rates. Increasing the learning rate by less than
50% results in a factor of six explosion in average utility
for this set of simulations. Of course, the large increase
in utility is the expected value; the actual change in util-
ity for a given industry can vary widely because of the
path-dependency described earlier.
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Fig. 4. The average utility produced by an industry over time
typically increases exponentially with increasing agent learning
rates. The data points were obtained by averaging over 30
runs for each value of the learning rate. The gray curve is an
exponential fit to the data.
The utility of training
Is there a relation between the utility produced by the in-
dustry as a whole and the average tenure lengths of its
members? This is a very relevant question in today’s
world of downsizing and rapid turnover. We ran a hun-
dred simulations of the model using the same parameters
and initial conditions in order to address this question.
Fig. 5 indicates the correlation found between short tenure
lengths and lower overall utility for the industry.
Discussion
In order to understand the interplay of social dilemmas
at both the organizational and agent level, we have con-
structed a simple model that encompasses cost-benefit
analyses and expectations at both levels. At the organiza-
tional level, managers decide whether or not to train based
on both the costs of training compared to the benefits and
on their expectations and observations of the number of
other firms that also train. Managers also take into ac-
count the sum of their employees’ contributions and the
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Fig. 5. Scatter plot of average utility versus average agent
tenure lengths for 100 simulations of an industry starting from
the same initial conditions and identical parameter choices.
average tenure length within their organization. At the
agent level, employees decide whether or not to contribute
to company production based on their expectations as to
how other employees will act. When trained, agents learn
over time and fold their increased productivity into their
decision whether or not to contribute as well.
We also modeled how easily employees can move be-
tween firms, a property we call structural fluidity. In addi-
tion, agents can leave the industry for good, and new ones
can join. New firms may be created when an agent leaves
its parent organization to start a new one. We described
how fluidity relieves the dilemma at the agent level by al-
lowing a large, low-productivity organization to break up
into smaller pieces. In extreme cases, the organization
may dissolve completely. However, when firms break
apart in this way, the total number of organizations in
the industry proliferates, exacerbating the dilemma on the
organizational level.
The dynamical behavior at the two levels is closely cou-
pled because of these interlinked effects. As a result, the
dynamical unfolding of the dilemmas on the employee and
organizational levels is path-dependent. The evolution of
the industry over time depends not only on the charac-
teristics of training programs, learning curves, and cost-
benefit analyses, but on the vagaries of chance as well.
Starting from the same conditions, an industry can evolve
to one of many states. In some cases, it evolves to a sta-
ble collection of firms that train their agents and become
more productive over time. In other cases, the number
of firms proliferates over time, and each firm experiences
high worker turnover and low productivity because of the
lower contributions of unpaid and, at times, unmotivated,
workers.
Our computer experiments also showed a correlation
between high turnover and low overall utility to the in-
dustry. However, these results were obtained assuming a
fixed environment. In the more general case, the environ-
ment will change over time, perhaps setting the employees
back in their training programs, or bankrupting firms en-
tirely. We plan to extend our model to include the effects
of a changing environment and to study how the dynam-
ics of the industry will be affected. We expect that in an
environment that changes continuously, effectively offset-
ting some of the benefits of training, that the dilemma on
the organizational level will be much harder to resolve.
In such a case, organizations that train will not be much
better off than those that do, but will still incur the ad-
ditional costs of training. The effect of an environment
that changes intermittently in an abrupt fashion is harder
to predict. While the benefits of training will not be as
great, we expect there to be a trade-off between training
and adaptability.
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